No. 81939-4 IN THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT

In re the Personal Restraint of:

JAMES EASTMOND,

Petitioner.

PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

By: Suzanne Lee Elliott Attorney for Petitioner 1300 Hoge Building 705 Second Avenue Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 623-0291

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A. SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 2000 James Eastmond was charged with one count of first-degree robbery and one count of first-degree burglary. Appendix 1 to PRP, Amended Information filed August 14, 2000. As to each count, the Amended Information stated:

... in the commission of said crime and in immediate flight therefrom, the defendant or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon; and that at the time of the commission of the crime, the defendant or an accomplice was armed with a firearm, as provided and defined in RCW 9.94A.310, RCW 9.41.010, and RCW 9.94A.125 . . .

Id.

The jury instructions told the jury that:

The term "deadly weapon" includes any firearm, whether loaded or not.

Appendix 3 to PRP, Instruction 12.

For purposes of a special verdict the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime in Counts I and II.

A pistol, revolver, or any other firearm is a deadly weapon whether loaded or unloaded.

Appendix 3 to PRP, Instruction 15.

The Special Verdict forms asked the jury to determine whether the defendant "was armed with a deadly weapon" at the time he committed the offenses. Appendix 4 to PRP, Special Verdict Forms. The jury

convicted Eastmond as charged and answered "yes" on the special verdict form questions.

B. SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT

1. THE DECISION IN <u>STATE V. WILLIAMS-WALKER</u>¹ REQUIRES REVERSAL OF THE FIREARM ENHANCEMENTS IN THIS CASE

The facts of the consolidated cases in *State v. Williams-Walker*, *supra*, are virtually identical to the facts in this case.

In each of the three cases here, the court submitted to the jury the special verdict form for a deadly weapon enhancement, not the form for a firearm enhancement, which was originally alleged, and the jury returned answers to those deadly weapon special verdict forms. In each case, the jury thus authorized only a deadly weapon enhancement, not the more severe firearm enhancement.

Id. at 888.

Based upon those facts, this Court found:

In the cases before us, the juries were given special verdict forms for a deadly weapon enhancement, and they returned answers in the affirmative. The fact that the State provided notice in the information to each of the defendants that it would seek a firearm enhancement does not control in cases where a deadly weapon special verdict form is submitted to the jury. When the jury is instructed on a specific enhancement and makes its finding, the sentencing judge is bound by the jury's finding.

 $^{^1\} State\ v.\ Williams-Walker,\ 167\ Wn.2d\ 889,\ 225\ P.3d\ 913\ (2010).$

Id. at 889. This Court also held that because the trial courts' errors occurred after the jury verdicts were reached, the harmless error doctrine does not apply. *Id.* at 900.

This Court's decision *Williams-Walker* requires reversal of the firearm enhancements in this case.

Eastmond was detained on these charges beginning May 22, 2000. The court imposed 36 months for the underlying substantive offenses and 120 months for the firearms' enhancements, for a total of 156 months. The proper sentence is 36 months plus 48 months (Former RCW 9.9A.310(4)), for a total of 84 months. Because Mr. Eastmond has served 123 months, he should be released immediately.²

2. THERE IS NO ISSUE OF "RETROACTIVE" APPLICATION OF ANY NEW RULE OF LAW IN THIS CASE

Generally, this Court has followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court when deciding whether to give retroactive application to newly articulated principles of law. *See State v. Evans*, 154 Wn.2d 438, 443, 114 P.3d 627, *cert. denied*, 546 U.S. 983, 126 S.Ct. 560, 163 L.Ed.2d

² On or around June 20, 2010, Mr. Eastmond suffered a series of very damaging seizures. He was moved to an outside hospital where he also suffered cardiac arrest, kidney failure and was on dialysis and a ventilator before his release 4 weeks later. He recovered somewhat and has been returned to the prison.

472 (2005); In re Pers. Restraint of Markel, 154 Wn.2d 262, 268, 111 P.3d 249 (2005) (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Sauve, 103 Wn.2d 322, 328, 692 P.2d 818 (1985)).

The Washington retroactivity analysis, adopted from *Teague v. Lane*, 489 U.S. 288, 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, *rehearing denied*, 490 U.S. 1031, 109 S.Ct. 1771, 104 L.Ed.2d 206 (1989), was summarized in *In Re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre*, 118 Wn.2d 321, 823 P.2d 492 (1992), as follows:

First, a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a clear break from the past.

Second, a new rule will not be given retroactive application to cases on collateral review except where either: (a) the new rule places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe, or (b) the rule requires the observance of procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.

The *Teague* inquiry is conducted in three steps. First, the date on which the defendant's conviction became final is determined. *Lambrix v. Singletary*, 520 U.S. 518, 527, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997). Next, the habeas court considers whether "a state court considering [the

defendant's] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution." *Ibid.* (quoting *Saffle v. Parks*, 494 U.S. 484, 488, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) (alterations in *Lambrix*)). If not, then the rule is new.³

If the rule is determined to be new, the final step in the *Teague* analysis requires the court to determine whether the rule nonetheless falls within one of the two narrow exceptions to the *Teague* doctrine. *Teague*, 520 U.S. at 527. But, because the *Williams-Walker* decision is not "new" as to Eastmond, these exceptions do not apply in this case.

The State points out that the judgment in this case was not final until December 31, 2007. The State takes the simplistic position that because *Williams-Walker* was not decided until January 14, 2010, the rule is "new" as to Eastmond. But the State fails to analyze whether a Washington Court would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the result Eastmond seeks now was required by the

³ Contrary to the suggestion in the State's brief, the Supreme Court does not presume that a non-unanimous decision by the Supreme Court necessarily establishes a "new rule" of law. *Beard v. Banks*, 542 U.S. 406, 416 n.5, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2004) ("Because the focus of the inquiry is whether *reasonable* jurists could differ as to whether precedent compels the sought-for rule, we do not suggest that the mere existence of a dissent suffices to show that the rule is new." (emphasis in original)).

Constitution before the judgment was final. The State's argument then is vitiated by the State's own affirmation that:

The new rule announced in *Williams-Walker* was based in large part on the holding of *Apprendi*⁴ and *Blakely*⁵.

State's Supplemental Brief, filed August 2, 2010, at page 5.

Because that is true, the application of *Williams-Walker* to Eastmond cannot be a "new" rule. And, in fact, Eastmond did make this very claim based upon *Apprendi* and *Blakely* while his case was on direct appeal. *See* Exhibit 1, Supplemental Brief of Appellant in Support of his Petition for Review, May 3, 2005, *State v. Eastmond*, No. 76777-7. He argued that his case was governed by the "rules" announced in *Apprendi*, decided in 2000 and *Blakely*, decided in 2004. In that brief, he pointed out that, because his conviction was not "final" under RAP 12.7, he was entitled to relief even at that late stage of the appeal process. *See State v. Hanson*, 151 Wn.2d 783, 91 P.3d 888 (2004). Inexplicably, this Court denied review.

Because Eastmond's claim is virtually identical Williams-Walker's claim and *Apprendi* and *Blakely* compelled the result in *Williams-Walker*,

⁴ Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

⁵ Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403, rehearing denied, 542 U.S. 961, 125 S.Ct. 21, 159 L.Ed.2d 851 (2004).

and Eastmond raised the claim on direct appeal citing Apprendi and Blakely, the rule is not "new" as to him.6

C. CONCLUSION

This Court should grant review, summarily reverse, order Eastmond's immediate release and remand to the trial court for resentencing.

Respectfully submitted this 8th day of April, 2011.

Suzanne Lee Elliott, WSBA 12634 Attorney for James Eastmond

 $^{^6}$ State v. Evans, 154 Wn.2d 438, 444, 144 P.3d 627, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 983, 126 S.Ct. 560, 163 L.Ed.2d 472 (2005), involved the application of Apprendi and Blakely to two defendants whose convictions became final in 1991 and 1999.

Certificate of Service by Mail

I declare under penalty of perjury that on April 8, 2011, I placed a copy of the foregoing document in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:

Mr. Thomas Curtis Snohomish County Deputy Prosecutor 3000 Rockefeller Avenue, M/S 504 Everett, WA 98201-4060

Mr. James Eastmond #821591 Monroe Correctional Complex Twin Rivers Unit PO Box 888 Monroe, WA 98272

Michael Schueler

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

 \mathbf{V}

JAMES EASTMOND

Appellant.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Suzanne Lee Elliott Attorney for Appellant Suite 1300 Hoge Building 705 Second Ave. Seattle, WA 98104

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(1995)	2

A. SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 17, 2000 a jury found Eastmond guilty of one count of first degree burglary and one count of first degree robbery. See Appendix 1. The jury also found as to each count that Eastmond was "armed with a deadly weapon." See Appendix 2. Despite the fact that the jury found him guilty only of using a "deadly weapon," the trial judge imposed two 60 month "firearm" enhancements. See Appendix 3.

Irregardless of what this Court does with the other issues in Eastmond's petition for review filed March 5, 2005, this Court must reverse the sentence imposed and remand for resentencing pursuant to this Court's recent decision in State v. Recuenco, - Wash. 2nd -, - P.3rd – (Slip Opinion filed April 14, 2005.

B. ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Where the jury found only that Eastmond was "armed with a deadly weapon" did the sentencing judge violate Mr. Eastmond's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by entering greater sentences based upon his conclusion that Mr. Eastmond was actually armed with a "firearm"?

C. ARGUMENT

1. CASES DECIDED AFTER THE VERDICT IN THIS CASE AND AFTER THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, BUT WHILE

EASTMOND'S APPEAL OF RIGHT WAS STILL PENDING, MANDATE RESENTENCING IN THIS CASE.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a jury trial. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-77, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This right includes the right to "a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt." Id., quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). The Sixth Amendment does not allow a defendant to be "expose[d] . . . to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone." (Emphasis in original) Apprendi, 503 U.S. at 483, see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 604, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). Additionally, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels any fact which increases a sentence to a term beyond the maximum be formally pleaded, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 609-11, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967). The United States Supreme Court has noted:

[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) (opinion of Stevens, J.)).

A sentencing court's ability to impose a sentence is limited to the maximum for that offense reflected in the jury verdict alone. <u>Blakely v. Washington</u>, __U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, __ L.Ed.2d __ (2004). <u>Blakely held</u>

the relevant "statutory maximum" is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose *without* any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts "which the law makes essential to punishment."

(Italics in original.) Id., citing, 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure, § 87, p.55 (2d ed. 1872)).

In Recuenco, supra this Court held that where the jury did not explicitly find that the defendant was armed with a firearm, the court's imposition of a firearm sentence enhancement violates a defendant's jury trial right as defined by Apprendi and Blakely because the sentence is greater than that allowed solely based on the facts found by the jury. The Court also found that previous Washington cases that held otherwise were no longer good law in light of Blakely. This Court also found that such constitutional violations can never be harmless. Because the jury's verdicts in this case found Mr. Eastmond guilty only of deadly weapons enhancements, he is entitled to resentencing under the *Recuenco* decision.

Moreover, any new decision on this issue applies to all cases, like this one, not yet final under RAP 12.7. State v. Hanson, 151 Wash. 2nd 783, 91 P.3rd 888 (2004) affirming In re Personal Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 823 P.2d 492 (1992).

D. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court must reverse and remand for entry of sentences on each count that include only the enhancement for a deadly weapon.

Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of May, 2005.

Suzanne Lee Elliott Attorney for Eastmond

W\$BA 12634

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I declare under penalty of perjury that on May 3, 2005, I placed a copy of this document in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to Constance Crawley, 3000 Rockefeller Everett, WA 98201-4060.

Suzame Lee Ellioti

APPENDIX 1

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR SNOHOMISH COUNTY

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,)
Plaintiff,	No. 00-1-00227-5
vs.) VERDICT FORM A
JAMES TAYLOR EASTMOND,)) Filed in Open Court
We, the jury, find the defendant, Ja ———————————————————————————————————	PAM L. DANIELS

Presiding Juror

as charged in Count I.

IN THE SUPERIOR CO	OURT OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON FOR	SNOHOMISH COUNTY Filed in Open Court
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,)	PAM L. DANIELS COUNTY CLERK By //race
Plaintiff,	No. 00-1-00227-5
vs.	SPECIAL VERDICT FORM A
JAMES TAYLOR EASTMOND,	•
Defendant.)	
We, the jury, return a special verdict	by answering as follows:
ime of the commission of the crime in Coun ANSWER: (Yes or No)	nt !?

APPENDIX 2

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR SNOHOMISH COUNTY

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,)
Plaintiff,	No. 00-1-00227-5
Vs.	VERDICT FORM B
JAMES TAYLOR EASTMOND,))
Defendant.	Filed in Open Court
We, the jury, find the defendant, ,Jacobs (write in not guilty or guilty)	ames Taylor Eastmond, PAM L. DANIELE COUNTY CLERK of First Degree Burglary, Deputy Clerk
as charged in Count II.	

Presiding Juror

IN THE SUPERIO	OR COURT OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON	Filed in Open Court For snohomish county ———————————————————————————————————
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,	PAM L. DANIEL. COUNTY CLERK By Afrale
Plaintiff,	No. 00-1-00227-5
vs.) SPECIAL VERDICT FORM B
JAMES TAYLOR EASTMOND,	
Defendant.	· <u>'</u>
	for Eastmond, armed with a deadly weapon at the
ime of the commission of the crime in the ANSWER: ANSWER: (Yes or No.)	
	Michael & Swale Presiding Juror



FILED

JAN 2 0 2004

CERTIFIE! COPY

PAM L. DANIELS SNOHOMISH COUNTY OLENK EX - OFFICIO DLERK DE GOURE

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR SNOHOMISH COUNTY

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON.

Plaintiff,

EASTMOND, JAMES TAYLOR

Defendant.

SID: WA19545109

If no SID, use DOB: 10/17/1980

No. 00-1-00227-5

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

[// Prison

Jail One Year or Less

] First Time Offender

[] Special Sexual Offender Sentencing Alternative

Special Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative

Clerk's Action Required,

restraining order entered para. 4.3 [L/ Clerk's action required

firearms rights revoked, para. 4.3 and 5.6

[] Clerk's action required, para 5.4 Restitution Hearing set.

I. HEARING

A sentencing hearing was held and the defendant, the defendant's lawyer and the (deputy) prosecuting attorney were present.

II. FINDINGS

There being no reason why judgment should not be pronounced, the Court FINDS:

CURRENT OFFENSE(S): The defendant was found guilty on November 17, 2000 by jury-verdict of: 2.1

COUNT CRIME **RCW INCIDENT#** DATE OF CRIME First Degree Robbery 9A.56.200 SSO, 0000509 12/30/99 Ш First Degree Burglary 9A.52.020 SSO, 0000509 12/30/99

as charged in the Amended Information.

[] Additional current offenses are attached in Appendix 2.1.

W	A special verdict/finding for u	use of a deadly DW 9.94A.602, 6	weapon which was a firearm 510.; 9.41.010.	was returne	d on Cou	rt(s)
[]	A special verdict/finding for use of deadly weapon which was not a firearm was returned on Count(s)					
[]	A special verdict/finding of sexual motivation was returned on Count(s) RCW 9.94A.835.					
[]	A special verdict/finding for Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act was returned on Count(s), RCW 69.50.401 and RCW 69.50.435, taking place in a school, school bus, within 1000 feet of the perimeter of a school grounds or within 1000 feet of a school bus route stop designated by the school district; or in a public park, in a public transit vehicle, or in a public transit stop shelter.; or in, or within 1000 feet of the perimeter of, a civic center designated as a drug-free zone by a local government authority, or in a public housing project designated by a local governing authority as a drug-free zone.					
[-]	methamphetamine when a j	uvenile was pr	committed a crime involving the esent in or upon the premise RCW 9.94A, RCW 69.50.401(es of manufa	acture wa	as returned
[]	The defendant was convicte vehicle while under the influe manner and is therefore a vi	ence of intoxicat	nomicide which was proximat ing liquor or drug or by the op CW 9.94A.030(45)	ely caused by eration of a v	/ a perso ehicle in	n driving a a reckless
[]	This case involves kidnappi imprisonment as defined in a minor's parent. RCW 9A:44	chapter 9A.40 R	egree, kidnapping in the secor CW, where the victim is a min	nd degree, or or and the of	unlawful fender is	not the
1	The court finds that the offer as a condition of sentence the	nder has a chem nat defendant sh	nical dependency which control all participate in the rehabilita	ributed to the tive program/	offense affirmativ	and imposes /e conduct:
	RCW 9.94A.607.					······································
	The offense in Count(s) facility. RCW 9.94A.510(5)		involve(s) do was committed in a a motor vehicle was use evoke the defendant's driver's	county jail c	or state c	
	,					
[]	Current offenses encompassing the same criminal conduct and counting as one crime in determining the offender score are (RCW 9.94A.589):					
[]	Other current convictions list offense and cause number):	ted under differe	ent cause numbers used in ca	culating the d	offender s	score are (list
2.2	CRIMINAL HISTORY: Prior score are (RCW 9.94A.525)	convictions cons	stituting criminal history for pu	rposes of cal	culating t	he offender
	≣ d Degree Unlawful Po ssession rearm	DATE OF <u>SENTENCE</u> 03/05/98	SENTENCING COURT (County & State) Snohomish County, WA	DATE OF CRIME	A or J Adult, Juv. J	TYPE OF <u>CRIME</u> Felony
2 Second Prope	d Degree Possession of Stolen rty	03/05/98	Snohomish County, WA		. j	Felony
[]	Additional criminal history is The defendant committed a 9.94A.525.	attached in App current offense	pendix 2.2. while on community placemer	nt (adds one į	point to s	core). RCW

	[]	The court finds score (RCW 9.9	that the follo	wing prior conviction	s are one	offense for	purpose:	s of determi	ning the offender	
	[]	The following pr	rlor conviction	ns are not counted a	s points l	out as enha	ncements	pursuant to	RCW 46.61.520):
	2.3	SENTENCING	DATA:							
	COUNT	OFFENDER	SERIOUS.	STANDARD	Р	LUS	TOTAL S	TANDARD	MAXIMUM	7
	NO.	SCORE	LEVEL	RANGE (not	ENHAN	CEMENTS		including	TERM	
		CSM		including enhancements)			enhan	cements)		
•	1	8	IX 36-48	46-61 months CEM	60	mos	[5% -	168 mos	Life	\dashv
	11	2 1	VII 21-27	31-41 months Crise	60	mm c	141	147	1 Ifm	\dashv
	*Firean	m, (D) Other dea	adly weapon:	s, (V) VUCSA in a pr	otected z	one, (VH) \	/eh. Hom	, See RCW	46.61.520,	
	(JL) r	Juvenile Presen	Ţ,						,	
		Additional curre	nt offense se	entencing data is atta	iched in A	Appendix 2.	3.			
	2.4	[] EXCEPTIO	NAI SENTE	NCE [For Determin	oto Sont	annal Sud	otantial a	nd		
	which ius	tify an exception	nal sentence	[]above []within	iate Sent I Thelow	the standa	rd range i	na compelli for Count(s)	ng reasons exist	
		. Find	lings of fact a	and conclusions of la	w are att	ached in Ar	nendix 2	4 The pros	ecuting attorney	
	[] did [] did not recomm	nend a simila	ar sentence.		401100 III 7 IF	poliuix Z.	Ti The pros	ecuting attorney	
		[] EXCEPTION	IAL <u>MINIMU</u>	<u>M TERM</u> [For Maxin	num and	Minimum	Term Ser	ntence] Sul	ostantial and	
	compellir	ig reasons exist	which justify	an exceptional mini	mum tern	n [] above	[] within	[] below	the standard	
	range for	Count(s)	Find	lings of fact and con-	clusions d	of law are a	ttached in	Appendix 2	2.4. The	
	prosecuti	ng attorney [] c	aia [] aia no	ot recommend a sim	ilar sente	nce.		•		
	2.5	ARII ITY TO PA	VIEGALEII	NANCIAL OBLIGATI	ONG TH	o court has			man =	
	2,0	the defendant's	past presen	t and future ability to	nav lena	ie court nas I financial c	s consider Migations	eu the total	amount owing,	
		financial resource	ces and the l	ikelihood that the de	fendant's	status will	rhance	r, including t The court fin	de that the	
		defendant has t	he ability or I	ikely future ability to	pay the le	egal financi	al obligati	ons imposed	i herein. RCW	
		9.94A.753		•				·		
		[] The followin	g extraordina	ary circumstances ex	dist that m	nake restitut	tion inapp	ropriate (RC	W 9,94A,142);	
									•	
	. •			1, ,		=:				
	2.6	The prosecutor'	s recommen	dation was 166	(month	s/days on 0	لير Count 1	51 (mont	hs/days on Coun	ıt
		2,, Th	ne prosecuto	r recommended cou				icurrently)co	nsecutively.	
				,	Destra un	L. Fire	CITCO NO	vi enhai	Ace non-Le	
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III. JUDGMENT

3.1	The defendant is GUILT	Y of the Counts and Charges listed in Paragraph 2.1 and Appe	endix 2.1.			
3.2	[] The Court DISMISSES Counts					
3.3	[] The defendant is fou	nd NOT GUILTY of Counts				
	,	IV. SENTENCE AND ORDER				
IT IS O	RDERED:	All Financial Condition to Clerk of this Court: exp imposed in original Surfence	ns Same as			
4.1	Defendant shall pay to th	e Clerk of this Court: The imposed in origina	I judgement			
	\$	Restitution to:				
JASS COD	<u> </u>	Restitution to:				
RTN/RJN	\$	Restitution to:(Name and Address—address may be withheld and provided co	nfidentially to Clerk's Office).			
RMA	\$45/\$25/\$ 5 0-	Restitution Monitoring Fee The Clerk shall collect this fee before collecting restitution or assessed legal financial obligations.	SCC 4 94 010			
PCV	\$100(\$500	Victim assessment \$100.00 crimes committed prior to June 6, 1996. \$500.00 crimes committed on or after June 6, 1996.	RCW 7.68.035			
CRC	\$ haived	Court costs, including RCW 9.94A.030, 9.94A.505, 10 Criminal filing fee \$ FRC Witness costs \$ WFR Sheriff service fees \$ SFR/SFS/SFW/SRF Jury demand fee \$ JFR Other	0.01.160, 10.46.190			
PUB PUB WFR FCM CDF/LDI/	\$790 (1/2) \(\frac{5790}{620} \), \(\frac{530}{530} \), \(\frac{5}{5} \), \(\frac{5}{	Fees for court appointed attorney Fees for all appointed conflict cases Court appointed defense expert and other defense costs Fine RCW 9A.20.021; [] VUCSA additional fine deferred due to indigency Drug enforcement fund of	RCW 9.94A.030 RCW 9.94A.030 RCW 9.94A.030 RCW 69.50.430 RCW 9.94A.030			
FCD/NTF/S CLF EXT	\$AD/\$DI \$ \$	Crime lab fee [] deferred due to indigency Extradition costs Emergency response costs (Vehicular Assault, Vehicular	RCW 43.43.690 RCW 9.94A.505			
	\$ <u>100</u> -	Homicide only, \$1000 maximum) Biological Sample Fee Other costs for:	RCW 38.52.430 RCW 43.43.7541			
	\$ 500.00	TOTAL	RCW 9.94A.760			
	by later order of [] RESTITUTION.	does not include all restitution or other legal financial obligation if the court. An agreed restitution order may be entered. RCW so Schedule attached, Appendix 4.1. In above shall be paid jointly and severally with:	ns, which may be set 0.94A.753.			
	NAME of other		(Amount-\$)			
RJN	1944 - 1944 - 1944 - 1944 - 1944 - 1944 - 1944 - 1944 - 1944 - 1944 - 1944 - 1944 - 1944 - 1944 - 1944 - 1944	•				

	[] The Department of Corrections may immediately issue a Notice of Payroll Deduction. RCW 9.94A.7602
All pay Depart than	ments shall be made in accordance with the policies of the clerk and on a schedule established by the ment of Corrections, commencing immediately, unless the court specifically sets forth the rate here: Not less
	\$per month commencing
	RCW 9.94A.760 All payments shall be made within months of: [1] release of confinement; [] entry of judgment; [] Other
[]	In addition to the other costs imposed herein the Court finds that the defendant has the means to pay for the cost of incarceration and is ordered to pay such costs at the statutory rate. RCW 9.94A.760 The defendant shall pay the costs of services to collect unpaid legal financial obligations. RCW 36.18.190.
[]	The financial obligations imposed in this judgment shall bear interest from the date of the Judgment until payment in full, at the rate applicable to civil judgments. RCW 10.82.090. An award of costs on appeal against the defendant may be added to the total legal financial obligations. RCW 10.73.
4.2	[] HIV TESTING. The Health Department or designee shall test and counsel the defendant for HIV as soon as possible and the defendant shall fully cooperate in the testing. The defendant, if out of custody, shall report to the HIV/AIDS Program Office at 3020 Rucker, Suite 206, Everett, WA 98201 within one (1) hour of this order to arrange for the test. RCW 70.24,340
	[\sqrt{]} DNA TESTING. The defendant shall have a blood sample drawn for purposes of DNA identification analysis and the defendant shall fully cooperate in the testing. The appropriate agency, the county or Department of Corrections, shall be responsible for obtaining the sample prior to the defendant's release from confinement. RCW 43.43.754
4.3	The defendant shall not have contact with Thomas Gibler including, but not limited to, personal, verbal, telephonic, written or contact through a third party for https://www.new.nce . EVEN IF THE PERSON WHO THIS ORDER PROTECTS INVITES OR ALLOWS CONTACT, YOU CAN BE ARRESTED AND PROSECUTED. ONLY THE COURT CAN CHANGE THIS ORDER. YOU HAVE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY TO AVOID OR REFRAIN FROM VIOLATING THIS ORDER.
[]	(Check for any domestic violence crime as defined by RCW 10.99.020(3)): VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE UNDER CHAPTER 26.50 RCW AND WILL SUBJECT A VIOLATOR TO ARREST. ANY ASSAULT, DRIVE-BY SHOOTING, OR RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT THAT IS A VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A FELONY. RCW 10.99.050.
[]	(Check for any harassment crime as defined by RCW 9A.46.060): VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE UNDER CHAPTER 9A.46 AND WILL SUBJECT A VIOLATOR TO ARREST. RCW 9A.46.080.
[]	(For Domestic Violence orders only:) The clerk of the court shall forward a copy of this order on or before the next judicial day to the
	lives), which shall enter it in a computer-based criminal intelligence system available in this state used by law enforcement to list outstanding warrants.
4.4	OTHER: All Conditions other than prison funtence

4.5	CONFINEMENT OVER ONE YEAR.
	CONFINEMENT [Determinate Sentences]. Defendant is sentenced to the following term of total ment in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC):
	15+60 mas months on Count
21 W	TO THE MOS MONTHS ON COUNT
. h	CONFINEMENT [Maximum Term And Minimum Term]. Defendant is sentenced to total confinement as
follows.	The maximum and minimum terms of confinement shall be served in a facility or institution operated, or
utilizea	under contract, by the State of Washington.
	Count: maximum term of years AND minimum term of months
	Count: maximum term of years AND minimum term of months
٠	FURTHER PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL SENTENCES:
(Add ma	The minimum term of actual total confinement ordered on all counts cumulatively is morths and and deadly weapon enhancement time to run consecutively to other counts. See Sec. 2.3, ce Data above.)
	The maximum term of total confinement ordered on all counts cumulatively is 156 months
finding o	All counts shall be served concurrently, except for the portion of those counts for which there is a special of a firearm or other deadly weapon as set forth above at Section 2.3, and except for the following counts hall be served consecutively:
	The sentence herein shall run consecutively with the sentence in cause number(s)
	but concurrently to any other felony cause not referred to in this Judgment. RCW 9.94A.589
	Confinement shall commence immediately unless otherwise set forth here:
	The defendant shall receive credit for time served prior to sentencing if that confinement was solely under this cause number. RCW 9.94A.505. The time served shall be computed by the jail unless the credit for time served prior to sentencing is specifically set forth by the court:
4.6	[V] COMMUNITY PLACEMENT [For Determinate Sentences] is ordered as follows: Count
	for 12 months; Count II for 12 mos
	months; Count for months. [] COMMUNITY CUSTODY RANGE [For Determinate Sentences] is ordered as follows:
	Count for a range from to months:
	Count for a range from to months:

Judgment and Sentence (Felony) Over One Year Page 6 of 21 St. v. EASTMOND, JAMES TAYLOR PA#00F00244

Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney S:\felony\forms\sent\over.mrg VIO/CSM/caw

and standard mandatory conditions are ordered. [See RCW 9.94A for community placement offenses serious violent offense, second degree assault, any crime against a person with a deadly weapon finding. Chapter 69.50 or 69.52 RCW offense. Community custody follows a term for a sex offense RCW 9.94A. Use paragraph 4.7 to impose community custody following work ethic camp.]
[] COMMUNITY CUSTODY [For Maximum And Minimum Term Sentences]: For each count, the defendant is sentenced to community custody under the supervision of the Department of Corrections (DOC) and the authority of the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board for any period of time that the defendant is released from total confinement before expiration of the maximum sentence. In addition to other conditions, the defendant shall comply with any conditions imposed by the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board under RCW 9.94A.713; 9.95.420, .425, .430, .435.
While on community placement or community custody, the defendant shall: (1) report to and be available for contact with the assigned community corrections officer as directed; (2) work at DOC-approved education, employment and/or community restitution; (3) not consume controlled substances except pursuant to lawfully issued prescriptions; (4) not unlawfully possess controlled substances while in community custody; (5) pay supervision fees as determined by DOC; and (6) perform affirmative acts necessary to monitor compliance with orders of the court as required by DOC. The residence location and living arrangements are subject to the prior approval of DOC while in community placement or community custody. Community custody for sex offenders may be extended for up to statutory maximum term of the sentence. Violation of community custody imposed for a sex offense may result in additional confinement. [] The defendant shall not consume any alcohol. [] Defendant shall have no contact with:
[] Defendant shall remain [] within [] outside of a specific geographical boundary, to wit:
[] The defendant shall participate in the following crime-related treatment or counseling services:
[] The defendant shall undergo an evaluation for treatment for [] domestic violence [] substance abuse [
] mental health
[] anger management and fully comply with all recommended treatment.
[] The defendant shall comply with the following crime-related prohibitions:

	Other conditions may be imposed by the court or DOC during community custody, or are set forth here:
4.7	[] WORK ETHIC CAMP. RCW 9.94A.690, RCW 72.09.410. The court finds that the defendant is eligible and is likely to qualify for work ethic camp and the court recommends that the defendant serve the sentence at a work ethic camp. Upon completion of work ethic camp, the defendant shall be released on community custody for any remaining time of total confinement, subject to the conditions below. Violation of the conditions of community custody may result in a return to total confinement for the balance of the defendant's remaining time of total confinement. The conditions of community custody are stated above in Section 4.6.
4.8 defend	OFF LIMITS ORDER (known drug trafficker) RCW 10.66.020. The following areas are off limits to the dant while under the supervision of the County Jail or Department of Corrections:
4.9	Unless otherwise ordered, all conditions of this sentence shall remain in effect notwithstanding any appeal.

V. NOTICES AND SIGNATURES

- 5.1 COLLATERAL ATTACK ON JUDGMENT. Any petition or motion for collateral attack on this judgment and sentence, including but not limited to any personal restraint petition, state habeas corpus petition, motion to vacate judgment, motion to withdraw guilty plea, motion for new trial or motion to arrest judgment, must be filed within one year of the final judgment in this matter, except as provided for in RCW 10.73.100. RCW 10.73.090
- LENGTH OF SUPERVISION. For an offense committed prior to July 1, 2000, the defendant shall remain under the court's jurisdiction and the supervision of the Department of Corrections for a period up to 10 years from the date of sentence or release from confinement, whichever is longer, to assure payment of all legal financial obligations unless the court extends the criminal judgment an additional 10 years. For an offense committed on or after July 1, 2000, the court shall retain jurisdiction over the offender, for the purposes of the offender's compliance with payment of the legal financial obligations, until the obligation is completely satisfied, regardless of the statutory maximum for the crime. RCW 9.94A.753(4); RCW 9.94A.760 and RCW 9.94A.505(4).
- 5.3 NOTICE OF INCOME-WITHHOLDING ACTION. If the court has not ordered an immediate notice of payroll deduction in paragraph 4.1, you are notified that the Department of Corrections may issue a notice of payroll deduction without notice to you if you are more than 30 days past due in monthly payments in an amount equal to or greater than the amount payable for one month. RCW 9.94A.7602. Other income-withholding action under RCW 9.94A may be taken without further notice. RCW 9.94A.7606.

5.4	RESTITUTION HEARING. [] Defendant waives any right to be present at any restitution hearing (sign initials): [] Defendant waives any right to a restitution hearing within 6 months RCW 9.94A.750. [] A restitution hearing shall be set for
	The Prosecutor shall provide a copy of the proposed restitution order and supporting affidavit(s) of victim(s) 21 judicial days prior to the date set for said restitution hearing. The defendant's presence at said restitution hearing may be excused only if a copy of the proposed restitution order is signed by both defendant and defense counsel and returned to the Court and Prosecutor no later than 10 judicial days prior to said hearing.

5.5 Any violation of this Judgment and Sentence is punishable by up to 60 days of confinement per violation. RCW 9.94A.634

Cross off if not applicable:

5.6 FIREARMS. You may not own, use or possess any firearm unless your right to do so is restored by a court of record. (The court clerk shall forward a copy of the defendant's driver's license, identicard, or comparable identification, to the Department of Licensing along with the date of conviction or commitment): RCW 9.41.040, 9.41.047

If this is a crime enumerated in RCW 9.41.040 which makes you ineligible to possess a firearm, you must surrender any concealed pistol license at this time, if you have not already done so.

(Pursuant to RCW 9.41.047(1), the Judge shall read this section to the defendant in open court. The Clerk shall forward a copy of the defendant's driver's license, identicard, or comparable identification to the department of licensing along with the date of conviction).

5.7 SEX AND KIDNAPPING OFFENDER REGISTRATION. RCW 9A.44.575, 10.01.200. Because this crime involves a sex offense or kidnapping offense (e.g., kidnapping in the first degree, kidnapping in the second degree, or unlawful imprisonment as defined in chapter 9A 40 RCW where the victim is a minor and you are not the minor's parent), you are required to register with the shexiff of the county of the state of Washington where you reside. If you are not a resident of Washington but you are a student in Washington or you are employed in Washington or you carry a vocation in Washington, you must register with the sheriff of the county of your school, place of employment, or vocation. You must register immediately upon being sentenced unless you are in custody, in which case you must

register within 24 hours of your release.

If you leave the state following your sentencing or release from custody but later move back to Washington, you must register within 30 days after moving to this state or within 24 hours after doing so if you are under the jurisdiction of this state's Department of Corrections. If you leave this state following your sentencing or release from custody but later while not a resident of Washington you become employed in Washington, carry out a vocation in Washington, or attend school in Washington, you must register within 30 days after starting school in this state or becoming employed or carrying out a vocation in this state, or within 24 hours after doing so if you are under the jurisdiction of this State's Department of Corrections.

If you change your residence within a county, you must send written notice of your change of residence to the sheriff within 72 hours of moving. If you change your residence to a new county within this state, you must send written notice of your change of residence to the sheriff of your new county of residence at least 14 days before moving, register with that sheriff within 24 hours of moving and you must give written notice of your change of address to the sheriff of the county where last registered within 10 days of moving. If you move out of Washington State, you must also send written notice within 10 days of moving to the county sheriff with whom you last registered in Washington State.

If you are a resident of Washington and you are admitted to a public or private institution of higher education, you are required to notify the sheriff of the county of your residence of your intent to attend the institution within 10 days of enrolling or by the first business day after arriving at the institution, whichever is earlier.

Even if you lack a fixed residence, you are required to register. Registration must occur within 24 hours of release in the county where you are being supervised if you do not have a residence at the time of your release from custody or within 14 days after ceasing to have a fixed residence. If you enter a different county and stay there for more than 24 hours, you will be required to register in the new county. You must also report in person to the sheriff of the county where you are registered on a weekly basis if you have been classified as a risk level II or III, or on a monthly basis if you have been classified as a risk level I. The lack of a fixed residence is a factor that may be considered in determining a sex offender's risk level. If you move to another state, or if you work, carry on a vocation, or attend school in another state you must register a new address, fingerprints, and photograph with the new state within 10 days after establishing residence, or after beginning to work, carry on a vocation, or attend school in the new state. You must also send written notice within 10 days of moving to the new state or to a foreign country to the county sheriff with whom you last registered in Washington State.

Cross off if not applicable:

5.8 RIGHT TO APPEAL. If you plead not guilty, you have a right to appeal this conviction. If the sentence imposed was outside of the standard sentencing range, you also have a right to appeal the sentence.

This right must be exercised by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within 30 days from today. If a notice of appeal is not filed within this time, the right to appeal is IRREVOCABLY WAIVED.

If you are without counsel, the clerk will supply you with an appeal form on your request, and will file the form when you complete it.

If you are unable to pay the costs of the appeal, the court will appoint counsel to represent you, and the portions of the record necessary for the appeal will be prepared at public expense.

5.9	OTHER:	Var
	DONE in Open Court and in the presence of the defendant this date:	2103
	JUDGE CERALO LI	KN 16 M
	MATHESON, #18556 BRIAN REED PHILLIPS, #9374 JAMES TAYLOR EAS	IMOND
	rosecuting Attorney	
l am a d languag languag	rtified interpreter_of, or the court has found me otherwise qualified to interpret, the	into that
I, <u>Pam</u> Senten	<u>Daniels</u> , Clerk of this Court, certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the Juce in the above-entitled action, now on record in this office. JAN 2 0 2004	Igment and
	WITNESS my hand and seal of the said Superior Court affixed this date: Clerk of said County and State,	Deputy Clerk

ORDER OF COMMITMENT

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON to the Sheriff of the County of Snohomish; State of Washington, and to the Secretary of the Department of Corrections, and the Superintendent of the Washington Corrections Center of the State of Washington, GREETINGS:

WHEREAS, JAMES TAYLOR EASTMOND, has been duly convicted of the crime(s) of as charged in the Amended Information filed in the Superior Court of the State of Washington, in and for the County of Snohomish, and judgment has been pronounced against him/her that he/she be punished therefore by imprisonment in such correctional institution under the supervision of the Department of Corrections, Division of Prisons, as shall be designated by the Secretary of the Department of Corrections pursuant to RCW 72.02.210, for the term(s) as provided in the judgment which is incorporated by reference, all of which appears of record in this court; a certified copy of said judgment being endorsed hereon and made a part thereof, Now, Therefore,

THIS IS TO COMMAND YOU, the said Sheriff, to detain the said defendant until called for by the officer authorized to conduct him to the Washington Corrections Center at Shelton, Washington, in Mason County, and this is to command you, the said Superintendent and Officers in charge of said Washington Corrections Center to receive from the said officers the said defendant for confinement, classification, and placement in such corrections facilities under the supervision of the Department of Corrections, Division of Prisons, as shall be designated by the Secretary of the Department of Corrections.

And these presents shall be authority for the same. HEREIN FAIL NOT.

WITNESS the Honorable <u>Gorald L. Knight</u>, Judge of the said Superior Court and the seal thereof, this <u>Ile+h</u> day of <u>Tanuary</u>, 200%. 4

Pam L. Daniels
CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

By: Wany albert
Deputy Perk

IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT

SID No. <u>WA19545109</u> (If no SID take fingerprint card for State Patrol)		Patrol) Date	Date of Birth: 10/17/1980		
FBI No.		Loca	Local ID No.		
PCN No.		DOC	821591		
Alias name, SSN, [OOB:				
Race:White		Ethnicity: [] Hispanic [] Non-Hispanic	Sex: M		
Height: 6'0	Weight:140	Hair: Brown	Eyes: Hazel		
fingerprints and sig Dated: <u> ー/レース</u>	nature thereto. Clerk of the	defendant who appeared in (Court on this document affix his or her		
Left four fingers	teken simultaneously	Left Thumb Right Thumb	Right four fingers taken simultene		

Judgment and Sentence (Felority Over One Year St. v. EASTMOND: JAMES TATEOR

Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney S:\telony\forms\sent\tover.mrg \text{VIO/CSM/caw}

APPENDIX A TO PLEA AGREEMENT PROSECUTOR'S UNDERSTANDING OF DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL HISTORY (SENTENCING REFORM ACT)

DATE: December 22, 2003 (da/gp/dhw) DEFENDANT: **EASTMOND**, **James Taylor**

DOB: ·

10/17/80 W/M

SID: WA19545109

FBI: 231741MB6

DOC: \821591

DOL: EASTM-JT-207PP

CRIME

DATE OF

PLACE OF

Incarceration/Probation

CONVICTION CONVICTION DISPOSITION

ADULT FELONIES:

None

ADULT MISDEMEANORS:

1.	No Valid License/Expired License	12/21/98	Oregon
2.	No Valid License/Expired License	1/18/99	Snohomish County
3.	No Valid License/Expired License	1/26/99	Snohomish County
4.	Driving While Suspended/Revoked	7/15/98	Snohomish County
5.	Driving While Suspended/Revoked	7/19/99	Snohomish County
6.	Possession Drug Paraphernalia	-2/8/00	Utah
7.	VUCSA - Possession	2/8/00	Utah

JUVENILE FELONIES:

*Take Motor Vehicle w/o Permission

8/29/95

Snohomish County

Community Supervision

^{*}Conviction "washes" Defendant was Under Age 15 on the Date of Offense

**Second Degree Unlawful Possession	3/5/98	Sno
of Firearm		

Snohomish County

Community Supervision

3/5/98

Snohomish County

Detention

JUVENILE SERIOUS TRAFFIC:

None.

OTHER: (NOT COUNTED AS CRIMINAL HISTORY)

DATE GOL

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney/WSBA# (155

^{**}Second Degree Poss. Stolen Property

^{**}Court Ordered Sentences to Run Consecutive